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Abstract: Given that historians have a voracious interest in studying the distinctiveness 
of cultures aross the world and across time, why do they have so little interest in learning 
or borrowing from the temporal and historical cultures of those places? This essay offers 
a practical case study of Buddhism, looking both at the richness and radical difference of 
Buddhist temporalities, as well as asking how these ideas might be used by modern 
writers to make histories. Its special focus is on the Theravada and Māhāyana traditions, 
and, most especially, Zen. Through studies of Zen time texts, I conclude that an 
appreciation of Buddhist „history‟ on its own terms might entail an abandonment of 
almost all the central premises of empirical history. This might become one starting point 
for the globalisation of History. 
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Preface 
 
This paper sets out what we could mean by Buddhist ideas of time and history: both how 
such ideas are constituted in historical texts and how they might generate new identities 
for history. It considers Buddhist ideas in themselves and the manner in which such 
notions impact on the western historical project. It introduces the radical potential of 
Buddhist temporalities and offers suggestions as to new lines of thought which are 
opened up by an engagement with such traditions. 
An alternate title for the paper would be „On lack‟, for  the first of Buddhism‟s 
surprises is that where we might become anxious about the distinct temporal lacunae in 
the western tradition – philosophy‟s sense of lack in knowing time, history‟s evasion of 
temporality and its fears regarding this lack of epistemological grounding, and the lack of 
historical and cultural understanding as to our place in making time – Buddhism 
celebrates lack. Lacking is a step on a path to understanding, for a recognition of 
incompleteness, unroundedness and uncertainty marks the beginning of the dismantling 
of the props of thought which lead us to think the world is as it is, manageable and 
describable, and not as it can be. 
My argument is set out in four parts: first, a critical consideration of what the 
western historiographical tradition lacks; second, an introduction to the study of 
Buddhisms; third, and centrally, an explanation of the radical possibilities of the 
Theravada and Māhāyana traditions; and fourth, a consideration of the manner in which 
Buddhist temporalities have been deployed in two forms of historical text. While this 
paper may fail in its analysis and its description, I hope that its premise in identifying the 
remarkable absence of Buddhism from historiographical discussion serves as justification 
alone.   
 
Historiographical background: what we lack 
 
There is a double lack in the fields of historiography and the philosophy of history, and 
indeed of the wider discipline of history itself: first, the absence of a rich culture of 
temporal discussion (as compared with anthropology, literary studies, philosophy, 
physics and sociology) and, second, a lack of interest in the methods and temporalities of 
other cultures, especially with regard to our potential to learn from those cultures. The 
first of these forms of lack is all the more striking in that history is a time word and we 
would expect that discussions of its epistemology could begin in no place other than the 
study of time. One of the central conceits of this evasion of time is the assumption that 
time simply is, that it is natural and therefore unquestionable, yet it is quite clear that a 
body of work now exists outside the discipline or on the margins of history which 
dismantles the assurance of the view that the historian can afford to leave time 
unquestioned (see Corfield, 2007). 
The writing of Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth stands, in this regard, as an exemplary 
case for both foregrounding and denaturalizing time. In Realism, Consensus and the 
English Novel: Time, Space and Narrative (1983), Deeds Ermarth set out the 
distinctiveness of „historical time‟ (which we might equally call western or empirical 
time) and the manner in which it both drew on and contributed to western modernity 
(1992: 26): 
 
The medium of historical time is a construct and itself a representation of the first 
magnitude. This “history” may be one of the most specifically modern achievements. 
Without the production of history, […] without the production of neutral time analogous 
to the neutral space evident in realist painting, we would be without that temporal 
medium that makes possible an activity unknown in classical times: the mutually 
informative measurement between widely separated events that underlies modern 
empirical science, modern cartography, and exploration […] It is demonstrable that 
“history” belongs to the same descriptive conventions that made possible the painting and 
architecture of the Renaissance and the empirical science of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. 
 
History is therefore utterly dependent upon a new means of picturing time which emerges 
in western Europe at a distinct moment. It conceives of itself as neutral and progressive 
because it is self-evidently different to earlier conceptions of time, and because it is part 
of a complex of ideas about space and time which enabled huge advances in productivity: 
in making histories as much as in making paintings or machines. As a human creation, 
this idea of historical time is just as subject to critique and innovation as any other 
invention. 
In her second book (1992) – Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of 
Representational Time – Deeds Ermarth moved forwards to look at the manner in which 
time has changed in the post-Newtonian world and at the failure of the academic 
discipline of history – understandably wedded to its own account of time – to adapt to 
this new picture of time. For Deeds Ermarth, this new temporality lies at the very heart of 
the modern and postmodern world, for, like Ricœur, she believes that orientations 
towards time constitute central differences in systems of thought; in spirits of ages. Post-
Einsteinian relativist thought and modernist and postmodern conjecture should therefore 
be of especial importance to history, for they offer a new understanding of time which 
historians could adopt in the manner in which such temporal innovations have been made 
and taken up by painters and poets.  
Just as the painters of the Renaissance pointed the way to a new temporal world in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it is the new temporalities seen in modernist culture 
which point to new ways of life in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As Deeds 
Ermarth puts it (1992: 31-32): 
 
Like the redefinition of space in painting since cubism, the redefinition of time that has 
occurred in postmodern narrative literally takes us from a medium that has been vital to 
Western empiricist culture and with it various important constructs, including that all-
important changeling, the individual subject. 
 
The forms of change she is talking about here are then fundamental: of form, time and 
selfhood. There is no reason to suppose that history would be immune from such change, 
not least because of its dependence on Renaissance-era constructions of time, self and 
narrative. Comparisons with Buddhist temporalities are especially apt here for there are 
evident connections between the waning of a certain grounding of the self in modern 
western culture and Buddhists‟ long-held valorisation of the idea of the dissolving of 
selfhood. 
The development of the idea of the historian‟s duty to pluralize and question her 
sense of time comes not just from writers like Deeds Ermarth but also from allied brands 
of postcolonial thought and the development of truly comparative forms of world history. 
The notion that history and its time may lie untroubled is subjected to a critique of its 
impoverished scope by writers as varied as Peter Burke (2002) and Robert Young. 
Young expertly tracked the colonial function of empirical history in White 
Mythologies: Writing History and the West (1990), in which he considered how one 
might de-occidentalize the academy and the historical enterprise. This would, he argued, 
be a difficult task for, in sometimes hidden ways, disciplines like history are still living in 
a nineteenth-century world, which serves as a means for the reproduction of the same 
premises which informed the historical judgements of writers such as Hegel and Marx.  
 
History must, according to Young, find „new logics‟ as a means of interrogating the 
subtler links which exist today between western ideas of temporality and selfhood and 
forms of neo-colonialism. Young looked to writers like Fanon and Aimé Césaire as 
figures whose central interest in the psychology and character of western colonialism 
might produce a broader dividend for students of the past (1990: 118), asking: 
 
But how to write a new history? When, as Césaire observed, the only history is white? 
The critique of the structures of colonialism might seem a marginal activity in relation to 
the mainstream political issues of literary and cultural theory, catering only for minorities 
or for those with a specialist interest in colonial history. But although it is concerned with 
the geographical peripheries of metropolitan European culture, its long-term strategy is to 
effect a radical restructuring of European thought and, particularly, historiography. 
 
It is of critical strategic importance to my own argument and the debates to which I hope 
to contribute that Young‟s object of study, and that which he aspires to change, is western 
thought (most especially historiography), and that the means to such change is forms of 
de-occidentalisation which evidently emerge outside the west. In a sense, such a project 
aims to apply the central doubts of anthropology in the latter half of the twentieth century 
– where anthropology came to see that its classic texts served as much as insights into the 
culture of the west as they did to other places – to the academy more generally, and to 
history in particular. 
If we take Young‟s medicine, following its very basic shift in perspective and 
belief in the other‟s capacity to know things that we do not, our sense of what counts as 
history might begin to change. Once we see the non-west as an influence rather than 
simply an object of study, history will begin to move in the manner in which subaltern 
studies have showed literary scholars the potential for method and theory to emerge from 
the periphery into the west. 
The claims of Young, Deeds Ermarth and Burke come together in Donald J. 
Wilcox‟s brilliant study The Measure of Times Past: Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and 
the Rhetoric of Relative Time. Wilcox takes the value of non-western temporalities, and 
the potential of cross-cultural borrowing, very seriously. Yet as well as this broadening of 
spatial possibility, he also identifies the potentiality of earlier, pre-modern forms of 
„western history‟ (1987: 13): 
 
These non-Western narratives by their very nature are hard to incorporate into our own 
experience. The sense of absolute time seems a distinctive western contribution, 
colouring our view of the world and shaping our sense of self and society. Absolute time 
is undeniably a Western contrivance, but most [earlier] Western history is not recorded in 
absolute time. 
 
Wilcox contends that both premodern and non-western modes of temporality (1987: 12) 
„have identified a sense of time much closer to that which underlies the Einsteinian 
universe than the one Westerners currently use in everyday life‟, and in a sense he sees 
his project as a means of outflanking „absolute time‟ from three directions: from the 
perspective of Einsteinian relativized time, from non-western modes of temporality, and 
from the pre-modern west (1987: 271). 
Like Deeds Ermarth, Wilcox goes on to call for a modernist turn in 
historiography, but his grounds for so doing are different to those of Deeds Ermarth and 
Young, for the escape from natural, absolute time can come as much from the others of 
our past as from others elsewhere in our present world. As he says, (1987: 263), „To 
present individuals in ways that seem convincing to their readers, historians will 
increasingly have to shape personality in terms more like those of Proust and Calvino – 
and, coincidentally, of Suetonius and Bede – than those of Dickens and Eliot.‟ What I 
especially like about Wilcox‟s ideas here is his recognition that the radical complexity of 
modernist representation is mirrored in methods and styles which we find in the pre-
modern world. In other words, as well as advocating a move towards modernism, Wilcox 
is able to deflate the progressivist story in the very same move, just as readers of 
Einstein‟s work on time have often observed that while his ideas reject the Newtonian 
picture of the world, they bear resemblances to Buddhist and Hindu conceptions of time. 
The key to Wilcox‟s thought, as I have suggested, is that his remedy for „working 
historians‟ is that they need not necessarily think that they need to find metaphysical 
correction in those writers who most perturb them (contemporary modernists and 
postmodernists), for the answers they need are also made available in Bede and 
Suetonius. And, as we shall see, they are made available in other religious traditions, 
most radically of all in Buddhisms. 
 
Buddhisms 
 
There are a number of reasons as to why we should approach Buddhism both carefully 
and hopefully. There is great hope for the student of time for all branches of Buddhism 
are centred on time and unlike western traditions, the subject of time is expressed clearly 
and its epistemological importance is always recognised. Care needs to be taken, though, 
with the umbrella term „Buddhism‟, for there are good reasons as to why many 
theologians prefer to speak of „Buddhisms‟ in the plural. All faith cultures are 
fragmented, but there are especial dangers to claiming false unities across Buddhisms for 
key splits in Buddhist cultures emerged over temporal questions. This said, from a 
western view, there is a common anti-empirical view of time, or a movement towards that 
goal, which strikes us as distinct in the Buddhist tradition, and one of the overarching 
goals of this paper is the description of how that is mooted in early Buddhism and then 
more fully realised in later schools of the Māhāyana. 
Buddhism itself is broadly split into three schools or movements: the Theravada 
(Buddhism as we know it from the life of Gotama, the figure we call the Buddha), the 
Māhāyana reform movement, and the Vajryana. Additionally, as in other religions, there 
is a Buddhism of practice and a Buddhism found in texts; there is a Buddhism associated 
with monastic communities (the sangha) and one based on thought outside religious 
communities. In Buddhist texts themselves there are distinct traditions of systematising, 
fixing and numbering, and of more conceptual speculation as to the nature of things. Like 
many theorists I am more interested in Buddhism‟s speculation than in its systems. We 
also need to be careful with regard to the question of simplification, for certain 
speculations in Buddhism do rely on a dense set of traditions and ideas whose importance 
can be wrongly diminished in the bald desire to chase our object of study (bringing to 
mind Dubuisson‟s study (2003) of the means by which western scholars seek to impose 
the idea of religion upon non-western cultures which they ought to see resist many of the 
precepts which we associate with religion). 
These caveats aside, it is possible to distinguish between two forms of traditional 
Buddhist history. The first type consists of the stories, myths and accounts of important 
figures in the development of branches of Buddhism which together make up the 
background for the practice of Buddhism, most especially in monasteries. These histories 
are unexceptional for they tend to perform simple cultural and educational functions, 
often meshing with similar folk traditions in the many local cultures into which 
Buddhism travelled. In many cases their form and epistemological grounding bears little 
relation to the broader, and more radical, Buddhist cosmology. The second form of 
Buddhist history does draw on the Buddhist world-picture in a more coherent fashion, 
and can be found in texts such as the Anāgata-Vamsa, the History of Future Events, 
which rupture empirical understandings of time. 
 
The Theravada: towards a rejection of empirical time 
 
The Theravada tradition bases itself on the teachings of Gotama and the „basket‟ of texts 
which make up the Pali Canon, the earliest surviving collection of Buddhist teachings. It 
establishes Buddhism as being founded upon three „jewels‟: the Buddha, the monastic 
community (the sangha) and sacred texts (the dhamma or dharma). 
Scales and varieties of time are clearly set out in Theravadan texts. Gotama, for 
example, asserts (Keown 1996: 31) that he could remember back „as far as ninety- one 
eons‟, with an „eon being roughly equal to the lifespan of a galaxy.‟ The extent of 
Gotama‟s great memory across time was, however, described as being insignificant next 
to the lives of gods, planets and other parts of the universe, for (Keown 1996: 36) such 
figures measured time in billions of years, which could only be understood in a relative 
fashion by humans. There is a connection here between the great lengths of time in the 
world of the gods and the cyclical character of their time-experience. That their time is 
experienced in this fashion is not to deny the possibility of time seeming linear to others 
operating in mere fragments of the time of gods, but it allows those who live in linear 
time to break free from the idea that that must be the only form of temporal arrangement 
in the universe. 
Gotama showed us what this work looked like whilst in a meditative trance in 
which he saw his buddhahood within the line of buddhas (Warren 1922: 11): 
 
  And strenuous effort made I there, 
  The while I sat, or stood, or walked; 
  And ere seven days had passed away, 
  I had obtained the Powers High. 
 
  When I had thus success obtained 
  And made me master of the Law, 
  A Conqueror, Lord of all the World, 
  Was born, by name Dīpamkara 
 
 What time he was conceived, was born, 
  What time he Buddhaship attained, 
  When first he preached – the Signs appeared. 
  I saw them not, deep sunk in trance. 
 
Time is made central to Buddhism here. Whilst lost in trance, Gotama was able to read 
the drama of time, but not in an omniscient fashion for even with the great powers of 
buddhahood he was only able to find meaning rather than precision. This, curiously, was 
because he was both in the time of Dīpamkara and the time of his trance, for in the 
connected-selfhoods of Buddhist cyclical time, Gotama and Dīpamkara were both one 
and not one. The great vision of time which this affords is by no means a goal within 
Buddhism for it is a part of Samsara, the endless cycle of suffering through which we all 
live, and whereas other faiths operate with a sense of the future conditional which is 
oriented towards an impending personal fulfilment, Buddhism seeks to finally end the 
sense of personhood, consciousness and the individual experience of time. Nirvana, as we 
shall see, is a time rather than a place, but it is better still described as an un-time. 
In the Buddhist imaginary therefore (Keown 1996: 36) „a human lifetime, for 
example, seems like a day to the gods at the lower levels‟. This relativism was not a 
notion of convenience but an idea which allowed the temporal system of Buddhism to 
cohere in a manner which was consistent yet undogmatic and flexible. A religion such as 
Christianity needed to create a new language of poetic temporality in order to distinguish 
its textual offer from earlier faiths, but relativism has provided Buddhism with a core 
belief of a kind which served as well in the time before Christ as it does in the scientific 
world of the present. It is a relativism founded upon the premise that the universe is not 
centred around the lives of discrete individuals, and that any given moment of perspective 
on time lies relative to other sets of temporalities around them. It is wrong therefore to 
see Theravadan Buddhism as a culture which relied on an empirical picture of time, 
though it is true that much more radical forms of relativism would emerge in the 
Māhāyana. 
In fact within the Theravadan tradition we find a rejection of „natural‟ views of 
time in texts such as the Sri Lankan Visuddhi Magga (c.430 C.E.) where the method 
called the „fivefold questioning‟ of time is enumerated (Warren 1922: 243). This consists 
of interrogating the key aspects of time and existence in, respectively, the past, the future 
and, as seen here, the present: 
 
 “Am I? 
 “Am I not? 
 “What am I? 
 “How am I? 
 “Whence came this existing being? 
 “Whither is it to go?” 
 
There may be something reassuring to the western sensibility about these questions and 
the manner in which they cohere with foundational modes of interrogation in other 
religions and cultures, but the setting out of these questions is not undertaken to establish 
them as the bases of Buddhist culture, but merely to abandon them. All such questions 
are discarded for they represent the roots of a false picturing of the world; in which 
ultimate truths could be ascertained through the extension of an understanding of the self 
to the comprehension of the world. 
Of the three „jewels‟ which lie at the heart of Theravadan Buddhism (the Buddha, 
the sangha and dharma), it is the last of these which is the hardest to define for the 
dharma includes works of theology and philosophy, man‟s works in his daily life (which 
ought to accord with Buddhist norms and scriptures), and the constituent units of reality. 
The power of these connected ideas of the dharma comes across in the work of the 
thirteenth-century Japanese monk, Enni (Bielefeldt 1998: 204): 
 
Suppose there is a dark cave, into which the light of the sun and the moon does not reach, 
yet when we take a lamp into it, the darkness of long years is naturally illuminated. […] 
The dharmas of the mind are like this: when beings lost in the dark of ignorance and 
afflictions encounter the light of wisdom, they are naturally purified without changing 
body or mind.  
 
We are naturally people living in „the darkness of long years‟ but as bearers of dharma 
we also carry within ourselves the potentiality of „the light of wisdom‟ which Buddhism 
offers. The dharma then is founded on an idea of time for the darkness of the cave and the 
mind are both a form of stasis and becoming. As Williams says (2000: 114), „the 
„doctrine that all exist‟ is specifically the doctrine that if a dharma is a future, a present, 
or a past dharma it nevertheless still exists.‟ 
  Yet, why, one might ask oneself, should a dharma centred on enlightenment play 
such an important role in Buddhist thought given our knowledge that enlightenment in 
the sense of the illumination of the dark cave of life is merely an extension of man‟s 
suffering? How would the dharma lead us to nirvana? The Theravadan answer to this 
question is explained in the Abhidhamma, the canon of foundational texts which set out 
the philosophical basis of Buddhism. The „dharma theory‟ (dhammavada) of the 
Abhidhamma Pitaka distinguishes between two forms of dharmas (Bodhi 1993): 
 The unconditioned dhamma, which is solely Nirvana, and the conditioned dhammas, 
which are the momentary mental and material phenomena that constitute the process of 
experience. The familiar world of substantial objects and enduring persons is, according 
to the dhamma theory, a conceptual construct fashioned by the mind out of the raw data 
provided by the dhammas. The entities of our everyday frame of reference possess 
merely a consensual reality derivative upon the foundational stratum of the dhammas.  
 
The lighting of the darkness of the cave opens, therefore, a perspective on one of the 
realities which we as humans have the potential to understand. Yet there is a second, 
unconditioned, reality which can only be reached in nirvana; a concept which merits 
further description in the context of the Buddhist triad of karma, samsara and nirvana. 
If samsara is the cycle of life and death it is important to see that it does not lead 
to an eschatological end in the Christian manner. The fullness of the Christian end, with 
the promise of lives of joy or pain for those who are judged, contrasts with the emptiness 
of the Buddhist end-point, where the fullness of a life lived many times over is replaced 
with no-thing. As Gotama put it (Kapleau 1972: 7): 
 
Where obsessive desire is absent, there is neither coming nor going, and where coming 
and going have ended there is no death, no birth; where death and birth do not exist there 
is neither this life nor an afterlife, nor any in between – it is, disciples, the end of 
suffering. 
  
We should not therefore think of nirvana as either another place (Snelling 1992: 55) or as 
nothingness. Its character is simply not something which we can instinctively perceive, 
though we can gain greater understanding through the use of meditation and other tools 
which open us to the connections between the Buddhist worldview and the coherence of 
its ideas about time.  
Gotama also described the manner in which those who would find nirvana might 
begin to comprehend it in their lives (Coomára Swámy 1874: 103): 
 
That priest conducts himself well whose ideas of things as past or future have ceased, 
who is endowed with sacred knowledge, and who having overcome (the three times) is 
not subject to any future state. 
 
Nirvana is, then, even in the Theravadan tradition, very much an overcoming of the sense 
of time and, in particular, that sense of time which we derive from the natural world 
which encourages us to believe that there are three temporal modes which govern our 
existence. Looking at such claims we can understand how it is quite possible to see 
Buddhist thought of the most radical sort originating with Gotama, and not simply 
reflecting developments in later Buddhist cultures. 
 
The Māhāyana and history: time and untime 
 
The Māhāyana, or „Great Vehicle‟, school of Buddhism radically reinterpreted Buddhism 
from the third century C.E. as the religion spread farther into East Asia. It was in part a 
social movement, driven by constituencies which felt that Buddhism had become 
diminished and derailed from its original public purpose in its monastic centres. It also 
offered radically different interpretations of core Buddhist beliefs, such as the status of 
buddhas (which would be extended still further in the Vajrayana movement). As Keown 
(1996: 64) says: 
 
The major Māhāyana sūtras, such as the Lotus Sūtra (200 C.E.) embark on a drastic 
revisioning of early Buddhist history. They claim, in essence, that although the historical 
Buddha had appeared to live and die like an ordinary man, he had, in reality, been 
enlightened from time immemorial.  
 
In Gotama‟s time he was only able to teach people the basics of the Buddhist creed, since 
that was all they were ready for at that moment, but now a time had come when more 
complex teachings could emerge.  
Returning to the title of this paper, it is important at this point to reiterate the idea 
that lack is central to the Māhāyana‟s view of the move to the experience of 
enlightenment. Where western history is concerned with the derivation of meaning, 
sense, progress, knowledge and the attempt to assure truth, facticity and certainty, the 
Māhāyana time text (it is difficult to call these things histories, though I think that they 
are) is concerned with the fleeing from sense, meaning, truth, facticity and any notion of 
progress which structures such goals.  
The Māhāyana movement fostered a series of branches of Buddhism which 
adapted the faith‟s foundational teachings further, amongst which the Chinese school of 
Ch‟an (later called Zen when it was exported to Japan) is one of the most conceptually 
interesting. Before moving on to look at Zen let us briefly consider the equally influential 
Mādhyamika, best represented in the work of Nāgārjuna.  
If we compare Nāgārjūna‟s „Examination of Time‟ with that of Gotama cited 
above, we can see the way in which the Mādhyamakas delighted in unpicking the logic of 
existing philosophical systems in order to reveal new epistemological realities which 
needed to be confronted (Garfield 1995: 50-51): 
 
If the present and the future 
Depend on the past, 
Then the present and the future 
Would have existed in the past. 
 
[…] 
 
If they are dependent upon the past, 
Neither of the two would be established. 
Therefore neither the present 
Nor the future would exist. 
 
[…]  
 
A nonstatic time is not grasped. 
Nothing one could grasp as 
Stationary time exists. 
If time is not grasped, how is it known? 
 If time depends on an entity, 
Then without an entity how could time exist? 
There is no existent entity. 
So how can time exist? 
 
All earlier forms of Buddhism – especially as they related the concerns of texts to faithful 
practice – had been dependent upon some ideas of causation, for the so-called wheels of 
the faith needed to turn, yet the radical shift proposed by Nāgārjūna – in opposition to 
both Gotama and to empiricism – was that an examination of causation leads us to deny 
the existence of time. As Keenan writes (Griffiths 1989: 3) „In Māhāyāna Buddhist 
thinking all things arise in interdependence and there is nothing that exists apart from its 
causes and conditions.‟ Time dissolves not only as a metaphysical or conceptual category 
but also as a form of shorthand which distinguishes between past, present and future. As 
Nāgārjūna implies, the idea of time is inherently appealing to us but so long as we cannot 
establish that the present and the future exist as dependent entities within the past, then 
we are unable to rely on such a mode of thought as a means of structuring our 
apprehension of the world. 
As Conze (1993: 50) reveals, this approach to time drew on the broader 
Mādhyamika approach, for:  
 
The Mādhyamika philosophy is primarily a logical doctrine which aims at an all-
embracing scepticism by showing that all statements are equally untenable. This applies 
also to statements about the Absolute. They are all bound to be false and the Buddha‟s 
“thundering silence” alone can do justice to it. Soteriologically, everything must be 
dropped and given up, until absolute Emptiness alone remains, and then salvation is 
gained. 
 
Zen further extends the concept of personal buddhahood to contend that all meaning can 
be located in the moment, and most particularly in the practice of zazen rituals in the 
present (although there are important strands of Zen which reject a devotion to ritual). 
Such devotions effectively offer the possibility of access to a temporal continuum 
between unconditioned/earthly and conditioned/nirvana existence. As the Kenbutsu says 
(Watts 1990: 179), „The so-called past is the top of the heart; the present is the top of the 
fist; and the future is the back of the brain.‟ Thus we find an extension of the original 
ideas of the karmic cycle to its end point where all time is potentially contained in all 
beings.  
The Japanese monk Dogen‟s Shobogenzo (Watts 1990: 142-43) offers us a vivid 
picture of Zen‟s broadening of Buddhism‟s relativisation of time: 
 
When firewood becomes ashes, it never returns to being firewood. But we should not 
take the view that what is latterly ashes was formerly firewood. What we should 
understand is that, according to the doctrine of Buddhism, firewood stays at the position 
of firewood… There are former and later stages, but these stages are clearly cut. It is the 
same with life and death. Thus we say in Buddhism that the Un-born is also the Un-
dying. Life is a position of time. Death is a position of time. They are like winter and 
spring, and in Buddhism we do not consider that winter becomes spring, or that spring 
becomes summer.  
 Here the earlier Theravadan logic of causality is wholly abandoned. The karmic triad is 
also discarded for the movement of karma through bodies until its eventual redemption in 
nirvana is sacrificed in favour of an emphasis upon stasis and the achievement of 
enlightenment through meditation in the present. Where both systems coincide, however 
is in their overt insistence that Buddhism depends upon a meditation on, and orientation 
towards, time. As Dogen so pithily remarks, „Life is a position of time‟. 
The need for history disappears in such a system. For Zen, (Snelling 1992: 442) 
even „the historicity of the early patriarchs is irrelevant, since the authenticity of the 
enlightenment experience, which can be easily tested by an enlightened master, is the 
matter of primary concern.‟ In the manner in which earlier Buddhists described a fleeing 
of corporeality and consciousness in the transition from being to non-being in nirvana, 
the Zen Buddhist seeks to introduce this flight from apperception into the life of the now. 
As Enni puts it (Bielefeldt 1998: 205), „when we are truly on the way of no-mind, there 
are no three realms [of existence] or six paths [of rebirth], no pure lands or defiled lands, 
no buddhas, no beings, not a single mind‟. In other words, the foundational precepts of 
Therevadan Buddhism disappear in this interpretation.  
In an early history of Zen – The Secret Message of Bodhidharma or the Content 
of Zen Experience – the author (Suzuki 1970b: 227) comments that a leading figure‟s 
„landing on the southern shore of China is recorded as taking place in the first year of 
P‟u-t‟ung (A.D. 520)‟, but he then observes that „the question has nothing to do with 
these things. Zen is above space-time relations, and naturally even above historical facts.‟ 
Even if empirical history could be said to be realisable, it has no real point in such a 
worldview. This recalls Dogen‟s remark (Suzuki 1970b: 19) that Buddhism „is a doctrine 
that from the beginningless beginning has never been easily learned‟, with its temporal 
implication that the search for origins and fixity in time is to move away from the very 
ethos of Zen Buddhism. 
Zen rejects the idea that spiritual discovery must be a form of progressive journey. 
Instead it debates within itself the question as to whether enlightenment might better be 
arrived at through a concentration on Zen ritual and the study of the conceptual world of 
Buddhism, or whether it is more likely to be achieved through the practice of daily life 
and the loss of a sense of selfhood that comes through a life of action. Both approaches 
rely upon the idea that the enlightenment process is engendered by a move away from 
existence as consciousness to a realisation that within our unconscious being lies the truth 
of the de-individuated self; that, as Suzuki says (Suzuki 1970a: 107) „The Unconscious 
does not seem to lie too deeply in our homely consciousness.‟ 
A Zen history would, then, be an interesting thing. Other histories seek 
knowledge, understanding, analysis, perspective, detail and narrative, in attempting to 
explain the uniqueness of both things and times. A Zen history might try to do the reverse 
of each of these things. It would oppose the idea of movement in time and it would 
abandon the mania for description and thought which it perceived in empirical history. Its 
literary purpose would also be rather different to those histories which we know, for it 
could not be an entertainment, nor a contribution to our collective stock of knowledge 
(for that is of irreality). Instead it would serve as a form of incantation that would mesh 
with a driven spirit to take a believer away from things to no-thing. 
 
David Loy: the celebration of lack 
 
Having claimed that Buddhist ideas about time have had almost no impact on western 
historical or historiographical canons, we should acknowledge the exceptional work of 
David Loy. Loy‟s project has been the demonstration, in theory and in practice, of the 
potential for Buddhist ideas to become methods outside the Buddhist world and, most 
especially, in the west. His early work, such as the essay on „The Māhāyana 
Deconstruction of Time‟, has much to recommend it, but here I want to concentrate on 
his Buddhist History of the West: Studies in Lack (2002), which attempts to show what a 
Buddhist history would look like in form, subject and import, while taking an exemplary 
topic from our canon: the history of the modern west.  
Loy‟s history seems initially to be a work of great pessimism, for (2002: 2), „the 
history of the West, like all histories, has been plagued by the consequences of greed, ill 
will, and delusion.‟ What is more, it is centred on the idea that the history of the west has 
been characterised by a succession of cultures‟ attempts to deal with a sense of lack 
which has been felt by individuals and the societies which they constitute. Successive 
ages (2002: 1) have been defined by the manner in which they attempted to deal with the 
sense of lack and the cultural forms which they have developed as a means of salving this 
flaw, which has its deepest home in the forms of selfhood which modern westerners have 
inhabited. 
Yet Loy‟s ironic claim, which seems obvious when made from a Buddhist 
perspective, is that westerners should not be worried about the sense of lack embedded in 
their history and should certainly not devote more energy to trying to solve this supposed 
deficiency. In fact the sense of lack at the core of western culture ought to be celebrated 
for it could act as a spur to a form of enlightenment. Lack, after all, is synonymous with 
development in Buddhist traditions which attempt to diminish the individual‟s belief in 
their existence as autonomous selves and the concept that the social and moral world 
should be framed around the rights and needs of self-ruling agency. In Loy‟s view the 
history of modernity‟s stress on the increasing complexity and uncertainty of ideas of 
selfhood in a world of ever greater intricacy, and arguably diminished morality, needs to 
be seen as an opportunity. 
There is also a formal critique of western history at work here, for Loy implicates 
the empirical technique with the questing, progressive mode which characterises cultures 
which are driven by a desire for completeness and the resolution of lack (as much in the 
vain task of the description of the past as in the summation of absolute self-knowledge in 
the life of the individual). What is more, the empirical mode is useless from a Buddhist 
perspective since there is no need to look outwards in time or space (as though such 
things were unconnected from our own ideas of our being), for moral transformation will 
not be engendered through such investigations. Instead we ought to see that we are spread 
in space and time, and that all we now need to do is find a path away from our quest for 
fullness and move further towards lack. 
Yet could the western historian reject Buddhist historiography in Loy‟s terms on 
the grounds that adopting such modes would essentially constitute a form of 
proselytisation of a religious position; precisely the kind of role which History, as an 
Enlightened discipline, had rejected from the very moment of its formation as a discipline 
in the very late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century? Does the west need to fear 
the missionaries of the non-west? The answer is, I think, no, for even if a Buddhist mode 
of historical thinking and practice were to be accepted as legitimate within the diet of 
historiographical positions within the western historiographical canon, there is no reason 
for thinking that it should ever be more than a passionately supported minoritarian 
position which stood in opposition to the dominant empirical paradigm, in the manner of 
Conyers Read and Carl Becker‟s relativism of the 1930s, Toynbee‟s evangelical, world-
historical project or the postmodern stances of Munslow, Jenkins and Southgate. 
A related question we might indeed ask of Loy‟s history at this point is whether it 
takes us to a point any different to that which we would find in countless western religio-
historical texts in the period which he studies. After all, the „Decline of the West‟ was 
identified by Spengler through the study of cultural forms, and had been hoped for or 
predicted for over many centuries. Eschatologies need decadence to precede purification 
and Loy does not wholly reveal the scale of difference of his Buddhist enterprise to such 
works. One reason for this is that his work does not actually use that many Buddhist ideas 
beyond his grand thematic. A much greater potential existed, I suspect, in terms of 
method, for Loy to rethink not just the meaning of the history of the modern west, but 
also the means by which such a history was arrived at. In part this can be explained by 
the fact that he sees his work as a first step towards introducing Buddhist methodologies 
into western canons, but I cannot quite understand why the forms of history he studies 
and uses are not subjected to greater Buddhist critique.  
Empirical history is, after all, founded on precisely the kind of fearful sense of 
lack which he says should be embraced in the west, for historians are well aware that a 
gap exists between the things which they study and their modes of reconstructive 
description and historiography essentially serve as a means of enabling history to accept 
that gap or lack. Buddhist historiography, in Loy‟s terms, might, though, ask whether 
there are not reasons for celebrating the historian‟s lack. This takes us back to Deeds 
Ermarth‟s remarks with regard to the spatio-temporal movement in which history came 
into being, for if the relativisation of time can come to produce emancipatory possibilities 
in other spheres of life and culture, why should it not be the case that history‟s embrace 
of lack allows it to move onwards? 
 
Conclusion 
 
To return to my introduction, whether they like them or not, Buddhist ideas about time do 
prove to western historians that very different starting points exist for the enterprise 
which we call history, and that other historical cultures founded on radically different 
pictures of time merit the designation history, whether the form and purpose of such 
temporal cultures bears any relation to the style and aims of the things we call history. 
Western historians can choose to have no interest in other temporal cultures and intuit 
that they have nothing to learn from them, but they ought not ignore them. 
We have seen that Buddhism can hardly be said to be a natural place for the 
empirical historian to look for support for her methods and worldview. While divided by 
a central split between the Theravada and the Māhāyana, all Buddhism is predicated on 
an openness to discussion of time which is antithetical to the traditions of western 
historical study. Buddhists need to orient themselves in time and to devote their lives to a 
consideration of time in a conceptual and a practical sense. If successful this meditation 
leads not to revelation, truth and perspective but to a sense of transiency which might 
move into an understanding of un-time and un-being, which we can only really appreciate 
if we have grasped the radical epistemology of time present in Buddhism. Traditional 
western historians of religion saw the rejection of time in Buddhism and other eastern 
religions as evidence of a form of primitive mysticism, as seen in McTaggart (1908: 23), 
but I hope that this paper has begun to show how considered and rich such ideas are in 
Buddhism. 
On a superficial level, Buddhist ideas of time and history may be instinctively 
attractive to anti-empirical historians and historiographers, and a process of the weaving 
together of ideas and the investigation of different and common roots might take place as 
it has, to some extent, in scientific fields which interested themselves in antecedent ideas 
of relativism in Buddhist and other eastern traditions. Yet the issue with this approach is 
that we are not treating the thing as it is but asking Buddhism to play a role in a narrative 
of western development to which it is not so neatly suited. It is also quite clear that 
Buddhism‟s radical temporal offer takes aim at empiricism for quite different reasons, 
and in quite different ways, to, say, postmodern historiography, and there is little 
evidence that that latter camp has had much interest in non-western critique. 
When asked how the world began, Gotama responded that time should not be 
wasted on such questions for it could be devoted to attempting to escape samsara. In 
some senses, it  therefore seems inadequate to speak of Buddhist forms of history, 
historiography or a Buddhist philosophy of history. To do so is to use words and concepts 
which are antithetical to the Buddhist tradition, and just as that culture had to coin new 
language, ideas and paths of thought to describe itself, it would seem more realistic to 
close an appreciation of Buddhist temporality with a stress on the centrality of un-time. 
So what would this look like? 
 
Fig.1 Shoren-in Temple, Kyoto 
If history in all traditions aspires to be a form of understanding which arises from a 
meditation on time – in which a function of recording is meshed to a desire for meaning – 
then one of the most obvious places in which to look for Buddhist historical texts or time 
statements is in Zen gardens. 
If we accept the idea that Zen offers clear, and sometimes extended, notions of 
Buddhist time, then we ought to be especially interested in its gardens, which are perhaps 
the greatest expression of its culture. It should not seem surprising to us that Zen was 
particularly attracted, in art as well as gardens, towards non-verbal representations of its 
ideas. The notion that a garden can be a history, or even offer a philosophy of history, is 
also associated with Islamic ideas of time, and I suspect that are useful parallels, in our 
approach and their content, to be made between the Zen gardens of Kyoto and, for 
example, the gardens of the Alhambra. 
In what sense, then, can we say that this garden is a history? It is a history because 
it is clearly an exploration of time, which would seem to be a basis for the practice of 
history. Zen gardens are an invitation to explore the temporality of the Buddhist universe, 
and in particular the negotiation of the dualities which need to be overcome if we are to 
understand the Buddhist sensibility. In the garden we see both nature and the 
representation of nature, for the garden is full of rocks and moss, but they have been 
artfully placed there to offer a distillation of nature‟s character. In the garden we view 
time and a representation of time, for while the act of contemplation is an entry into a 
particularly privileged form of zazen time, we also understand that these are texts about 
time. Reference is made to the natural cycles of time which we see around us, for these 
are places which we are expected to see at different times of year, but we also understand 
that an attempt at transcending such forms of time is to be attempted.  
The garden is a place of joy and beauty but it is also a place of duty, for its 
simplicity is deceptive: just as the Buddhist needs much work over time to come close to 
nirvana, the Zen garden needs to be cared for in a devoted fashion. While many such 
gardens also connect to broader narratives, such as natural histories which explain the 
origins of things in the world, the garden should be seen primarily as a site for 
contemplation rather than explanation.  
Yet these features of the garden, whilst clearly available to those who apprehend 
it, are in fact mere preliminary stages which need to be negotiated before considering the 
garden as representing Zen‟s cosmology and a gift which allows access to that picture of 
the world. In essence, this dual function of the garden is predicated on the principles of 
the Abhidhamma Pitaka, for here there is both conditioned and unconditioned reality 
placed right there before us (the is and the isn‟t). The gardens are nirvana-movements; 
they are abstractions that take us on the path to no-thing for it is as though the universe 
fragments when we contemplate them. Their abstraction is an expression of their 
epistemological character as they strive to serve as bridges to a broader understanding of 
things as our ideas of selfhood dissolve in the manner in which nature begins to break up 
in the garden. Above all, the Zen garden is an opening towards lack and man‟s potential 
to make lack as a means to appreciating the positive centrality of this idea to Buddhist 
temporality.  
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